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A general theory of violence may only be possible in the sense of a meta-theoretical framework. As such it should comprise a parsimonious set of general 
mechanisms that operate across various manifestations of violence. In order to identify such mechanisms, a general theory of violence needs to equally 
consider all manifestations of violence, in all societies, and at all times. Departing from this assumption this paper argues that three theoretical ap-
proaches may be combined in a non-contradictory way to understand violence as goal-directed instrumental behavior: a theory of the judgment and 
decision-making processes operating in the situations that give rise to violence; a theory of the evolutionary processes that have resulted in universal 
cognitive and emotional mechanisms associated with violence; and a theory of the way in which social institutions structure violence by selectively enhanc-
ing its effectiveness for some purposes (i.e. legitimate use of force) and controlling other types of violence (i.e. crime). To illustrate the potential use of 
such a perspective the paper then examines some general mechanisms that may explain many different types of violence. In particular, it examines how the 
mechanisms of moralistic aggression (Trivers) and moral disengagement (Bandura) may account for many different types of violence.
The Uses of Violence:  
An Examination of Some Cross-Cutting Issues
Manuel Eisner, Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom
“In the course of time Cain presented some of the land’s 
produce as an o!ering to the Lord. And Abel also presented 
an o!ering—some of the "rstborn of his #ock and their fat 
portions. $e Lord had regard for Abel and his o!ering, but 
He did not have regard for Cain and his o!ering. Cain was 
furious, and he was downcast. $en the Lord said to Cain, 
‘Why are you furious? And why are you downcast? If you 
do right, won’t you be accepted? But if you do not do right, 
sin is crouching at the door. Its desire is for you, but you 
must master it.’ Cain said to his brother Abel, ‘Let’s go out 
to the "eld.’ And while they were in the "eld, Cain attacked 
his brother Abel and killed him.” (Genesis 4: 1–8)
Cain’s behavior can be explained in many di!erent ways, of 
which two are of particular interest to violence researchers. 
One is to speculate that Cain may have had some patho-
logical personality characteristics (“refuses to comply with 
adult’s/God’s requests,” “easily annoyed by others,” “angry 
and resentful,” “spiteful and vindictive”) that could be part 
of an antisocial and aggressive behavior syndrome, and that 
this led him to commit the "rst murder in the Bible. If fol-
lowed through, this approach leads to a violence-as-illness 
perspective.
An alternative possibility is that Cain was a normal human 
being who was competing with another human being for 
a valuable good, namely God’s regard. Angered by the ap-
parently unjust treatment, Cain "nds that eliminating the 
competitor is a way to gain an advantage (which he eventu-
ally does). In this perspective Cain was confronted with a 
universal problem of humans, namely unequal access to 
valued goods; he felt an urge for revenge, a desire that has 
roots in human evolution; and he used trickery and physical 
force to achieve his goal.
$e two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
In this paper, however, I will mainly explore the second 
option, arguing that many manifestations of violence in 
di!erent societies and across long periods of time can be 
understood as strategic, goal-driven behavior, molded by 
adaptive processes during the evolution of the human spe-
cies, and organized and transformed in social institutions. 
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In arguing along these lines I will draw liberally on argu-
ments and "ndings from a variety of disciplines, including 
evolutionary psychology, anthropology, criminology, his-
tory, sociology, and decision-making theory.
1. What is a General Theory of Violence About?
1.1. De!nition of Violence
For the purposes of this paper I de"ne violence narrowly as 
the intentional but unwanted in!iction of physical harm on 
other humans. $e de"nition results in several borderline 
issues, which merit attention.
Like most others I limit violence to intentional or deliber-
ate acts. Intentions are immediate aims—as opposed to 
more distant goals—that guide an action. However, harm 
that is an unintended side-e!ect of intentional behavior is 
not included in this de"nition. Accordingly, for example, 
Stalin’s conscious strategy of starving millions of Kulaks to 
death in the Ukraine constitutes violence, while the thirty 
million Chinese who died from starvation as an unintended 
consequence of poor economic policy during Mao’s Great 
Leap Forward does not (Rummel 1994).
$e notion of intentionality is not without problems 
(Anscombe 1956; Sheeran 2002). For one thing, the attribu-
tion of intent requires a judgment on the motivational pro-
cess leading to an action that is o-en hard to obtain. Also, 
the di!erence between deliberately in#icting harm and not 
being bothered about causing harm (e.g. in the slave trade) 
is gradual rather than categorical. $irdly, violent actors 
o-en cause considerably less or massively more harm than 
they intended. Finally, intentionality becomes a complex is-
sue when violence is used within an organization (e.g. army, 
concentration camp, organized crime) and where agents 
act on the orders of authorities. In such cases the actor 
who intends and implements the violent action may be far 
removed from the immediate acts of harm-doing.
By limiting violence to unwanted acts the de"nition ex-
cludes acts where the in#iction of pain has been mutually 
agreed and there is no con#ict of interests. $us, tattooing, 
sado-masochistic sexual practices, assisted suicide, or pain 
in#icted by medical doctors are not part of this de"nition of 
violence. In contrast, mere agreement on the circumstances 
of mutual harm-doing (e.g. whereabouts of the battle-
ground, staged "ghts, duels) does not constitute consent to 
su!ering harm.
I con"ne the notion of violence to the actual in!iction of 
physical harm. Hence the threat of harm (e.g. threat of 
killing somebody, blackmail, public calls for violent action 
against particular groups, etc.) and depriving somebody of 
his/her liberty (e.g. hostage-taking, slavery, or imprison-
ment) are not included unless physical harm is done. Also, 
unsuccessful attempts to in#ict injury are not included. 
$e exclusion of such acts is not unproblematic. Tedeschi 
and Felson (1994), in particular, have argued that violence 
should really be considered as a subcategory of the much 
broader class of coercive acts. However, extending violence 
to all acts that use threat as means of reducing the freedom 
of action of others would probably overburden the notion of 
violence.
Finally, the notion of violence is limited to harm in#icted 
to humans. $is limitation, too, is contested. For example, 
there is controversy, in contemporary societies, about the 
extent to which doing intended harm to animals constitutes 
violence (e.g. in animal protection laws) or about the mo-
ment when human life starts (e.g. abortion).
1.2. Geographic and Temporal Extent
A general theory of violence should apply to all types of 
violence, at all times, in all places. Geographically, it should 
have equal relevance (and equal explanatory power) across 
all existing human societies, whatever their cultural, eco-
nomic, or political characteristics (see also Karstedt 2001). 
$is point is important because a large chunk of current 
empirical knowledge is based on Western (i.e. wealthy, 
state-regulated, law-bound, and individualistic) societies. 
Consequently much theorizing is derived from the mani-
festations of violence that arise under those circumstances. 
Contrariwise, empirical and theoretical research, especially 
in criminology and developmental psychology, tends to ig-
nore the sorts of violence that are typical for less developed 
regions of the globe, including torture, excessive police 
violence, vigilante violence, genocide, and civil war.
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It is more di.cult to delineate the temporal domain of a 
general theory of violence. In examining the roots of ag-
gression amongst mammals and primates, some evolution-
ary theories refer back to the split between humans and 
apes about six to eight million years ago (e.g. Wrangham 
1999). However, it may be more prudent to restrict the remit 
of a general theory of violence to the emergence of modern 
humans, i.e. about 180,000 years ago. Since then the cogni-
tive, genetic, and anatomical out"t of humans has remained 
essentially unchanged, meaning that one important set of 
variables can be held constant.
$e implications of saying that a general theory of violence 
should cover all human experience at all places at all times 
are shown in Table 1. It lists major types of acts that satisfy 
the above de"nition. $e table also illustrates several points 
that will be relevant for the subsequent discussion. First, 
listing violence in non-state societies separately serves as a 
reminder that for most of human history the dualism of 
crime versus law-based justice is irrelevant. Given that these 
societies cover most of the history of humankind, a general 
theory of violence should be able to understand the role of 
violence in them.
Secondly, the table lists punishments as a separate category, 
although acts of violence that constitute punishment can 
also be found in other subheadings (e.g. revenge killings, 
hitting subordinates, lynching). $e separate heading 
mainly serves the purpose of alerting readers to the fact 
that corporal punishment in all its forms is an important 
subtype of violence.
$ird, the list comprises di!erent subheadings for violence 
committed by single individuals and for more organized 
types of violence that entail the coordination of large 
numbers of people. Despite the subheadings one should 
note that the di!erence between individual and organized 
violence is gradual rather than discontinuous: Minor insults 
may turn into a homicide that may trigger feuds, which in 
turn can escalate into war.
Table 1: Manifestations of violence to be covered by a general theory of violence
Childhood Aggression
Bullying
Fights
Violence in non-state societies
Ritualized "ghts
Revenge killings, feuds
Violent self-help
Raids
Battles
Massacres
Rape
Assassination of visitors
Infanticide, senilicide
Torture
Human sacri"ce
Interpersonal Criminal Violence
Assault
Rape
Robbery
Homicide
Infanticide
Child abuse
Domestic violence
Punishments
Parental corporal punishment
State capital punishment
Flogging, stoning
Organized Private Violence
Hitting, beating, raping, killing subordinates  
and dependents
Organized piracy and robbery
Assassinations
Private warlords
Gang wars
Legitimate and Illegitimate State Violence
Assassination
Torture
Wars
Massacres
Concentration camps
Executions
Genocide
Police use of force
Organized Political Violence
Assassinations
Civil war
Extortion of protection rents
Terrorism
Resistance/liberation wars
Revolutionary violence
Riots
Lynching
Vigilante violence
Extremist and hate violence
Note: Grouping under subheadings serves illustrative purposes and does not imply a theory-based classi"cation.
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2. Tasks of a General Theory of Violence
Violence research does not su!er from a scarcity of theories. 
We have theories of family violence (e.g. Gelles 1987), theo-
ries of child aggression (e.g. Kempes et al. 2005; Patterson, 
Reid, and Dishion 1992), theories of bullying (e.g. Rigby 
2004), theories of sexual violence (e.g. Ward and Beech 
2006), theories of political violence (e.g. Muller and Weede 
1990), theories of war (e.g. Levy 1998), and theories of geno-
cide (e.g. Neubacher 2006).
I believe that violence research will always need local theo-
ries that do well in either explaining speci"c manifestations 
of violence or that highlight particular mechanisms on the 
continuum of biological, psychological, and social layers 
of reality that are implicated in the causation of violence. 
In part this re#ects the fact that violence is embedded in a 
variety of social institutions (e.g. schools, family, the state) 
whose operational logic needs to be understood in order 
explain to role of violence within them.
Any general theory, if at all possible, will therefore be a 
meta-theory, i.e. an overarching and parsimonious set of 
general principles that helps to organize local theories (see 
Tittle 2009 in this volume). To be useful, such a theory 
would need to do at least four things: It should identify 
general mechanisms that operate on di!erent manifesta-
tions of violence. For example, it might demonstrate that 
"ghts between youth gangs, raids between neighboring 
tribes in non-state societies, and civil wars have common-
alities (e.g. regarding motives, participants, organization, 
dynamics) worthy of scienti"c generalization. Secondly, it 
would demonstrate that a few general principles bring forth 
similar manifestations of violence across cultures and over 
time. For example, revenge killings seem to be a universal 
phenomenon across all human societies. A general theory 
could help us to understand whether this pattern of con#ict 
resolution can be derived from one underlying mechanism. 
$irdly, it would need to integrate disciplinary theories at 
the biological, the psychological, and the sociological level 
in such a way that they are non-contradictory and that the 
resulting explanatory power is higher than that of each 
primary theory (e.g. Dodge and Pettit 2003). Fourthly, it 
should show that successful strategies of controlling and 
preventing di!erent types of violence are based on the 
same general principles. It would be useful to understand 
whether, for example, the prevention of school violence and 
the strategies for pacifying post-civil war societies apply 
similar principles that can be derived from a general under-
lying theory.
Many such meta-theories are possible. In the following I 
"rst outline contours of one such theoretical framework 
and then discuss some cross-cutting themes with a view 
to examining the potential usefulness of the suggested 
perspective.
3. Violence as an Instrument
Many current theories begin with the notion of violence 
as a psychological disorder and individual pathology (e.g. 
Hodgins, Viding, and Plodowski 2009) or as a morally 
reprehensible “evil” (e.g. Miller 2004). While research on 
violence as a pathological disorder has made huge progress 
in identifying genetic, neurobiological, temperamental, 
and family-related risk-factors associated with aggressive 
behavior, I am not convinced that these "ndings can serve 
as a basis for a general theory of violence. Particularly, it is 
di.cult to explain phenomena such as wars, blood feuds, 
capital punishment, or assassinations as the outcome of 
individual pathologies. Rather, a general theory should start 
by asking about the broader uses of violence in the pat-
terns of interaction that constitute human society, and to 
consider pathological violence as a special case within such 
a framework.
Hence the following considerations start with the assump-
tion that violence is an instrument that serves to achieve 
speci"c goals. It is a tool available to humans as animals 
with a high degree of behavioral plasticity. It di!ers from 
other instruments (e.g. language) in that it serves to con-
strain, coerce, subdue, and eliminate others—sometimes as 
an unprovoked attack, sometimes as a "ght, and sometimes 
as a reaction to previous provocation or attack.
$is is in line with the usage of the word violence in many 
languages. One does not commonly say that a person has 
violence or does violence. Rather, people use violence or 
force. Also, its instrumental character is re#ected in the 
fact that it happens under highly selective circumstances 
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against speci"c people. Also, violence is subject to techno-
logical change and humans have devoted a lot of time and 
energy to developing better and more e!ective technologies 
of coercing and killing. Finally, violence can be collectively 
organized and trained, and unleashed in controlled ways 
against speci"c targets.
At "rst sight, the notion of violence as instrumental behav-
ior seems counterintuitive. Rather, we tend to see violence 
as a generally unsuccessful behavior, as robbers generally do 
not succeed in getting rich, domestic batterers end up de-
stroying their partnership, and terrorists do not topple the 
governments they hate (Baumeister and Vohs 2004). How-
ever, it is easy to forget that the unconditional contempt for 
violence in modern societies is a result of the luxuries of 
wealth, safety, and protection, and that the stability of state 
monopolies of violence is a very recent phenomenon.
A “fair” assessment of the uses of violence would need to 
consider equally the instances when, for example, infan-
ticide or gerontocide helped a band to survive in a harsh 
environment, when empires were built by conquest, when 
kings were killed, or when individuals maintained their 
good reputation by defending their honor when insulted.
Archeological and anthropological research leaves no doubt 
that Rousseau’s notion of the peaceful savage was wrong. 
Archeological research has primarily examined skeletal 
remains for evidence of interpersonal violence, especially 
cranial injuries and embedded projectile points (for reviews 
see, e.g. Guilaine and Zammit 2005; McCall and Shields 
2008; Schulting 2006; $orpe 2003). Evidence is scarce for 
the Paleolithic period (ca. 2.5 million to 10,000 BCE). How-
ever, there is much more consistent archeological evidence 
from the Mesolithic period onwards. Despite the method-
ological di.culty of distinguishing injuries from intention-
al violence, archeologists come to the conclusion that lethal 
interpersonal violence was certainly not unknown and was 
probably quite widespread. Types of documented violence 
comprise, amongst others, "ghts between adult males, raids 
and wars, large-scale massacres, head-taking, violent canni-
balism, and sacri"ce (Schulting 2006). However, one should 
also note that even the limited evidence suggests large 
di!erences over time and between sites, making sweeping 
generalizations di.cult ($orpe 2003).
Anthropological evidence also suggests that violence was 
endemic in many societies, although, again, signi"cant dif-
ferences are found between cultures (Ferguson 2000; Keeley 
1996; Otterbein 2004). $e world record in lethal killings is 
probably held by the Waorani, a people in the Ecuadorian 
Amazon. Based on extensive genealogies over "ve genera-
tions, Yost (1981) found that more than 60 percent of adult 
deaths were a result of intentional killing: 17 percent a con-
sequence of external raiding and 44 percent from internal 
feuding related to vendettas, quarrels, or accusations of 
sorcery (Robarchek and Robarchek 1998). Comparable levels 
of more than 10 percent of deaths due to intentional killing 
(a homicide rate of about 200–300 per 100,000) are reported 
for a considerable number of non-state societies.
On the grounds of its pervasiveness in human history, 
many theorists of violence therefore "nd it useful to start 
with observing that violence is a means to get access to 
valuable goods that others may be unwilling to share or 
give away—ranging from lollipops and sneakers to money, 
horses, land, food, sex, or oil. Humans have developed vari-
ous ways to co-opt valued goods. $ey include work, charm, 
convincing others, exchange, stealing, and trickery. $e use 
of physical force is only one option, but has the important 
advantage that it is unilateral coercive action and as such 
does not require cooperation by or negotiation with others.
On the other hand, the use of physical force also has sig-
ni"cant disadvantages since it entails a risk of injury to the 
user and o-en requires substantive material and temporary 
resources at the cost of other, more productive activities. 
If possible, therefore, humans tend to prefer less costly 
strategies for acquiring desired objects. Generally, however, 
an instrumental perspective expects that violence is the 
more likely, the more highly valued the contentious good 
is, the more the aggressor subjectively expects that violence 
is an e!ective way for achieving the valued good, and the 
less attractive or accessible alternative routes of action are. 
Street robbers, pirates, rapists, and war strategists found 
similar answers to the question of how to best strike "rst: 
Make sure you are better equipped and in larger numbers 
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than your target, choose a vulnerable victim, and attack the 
victim by surprise.
Of course, instrumental rationality is inferred rather than 
conclusively demonstrated in archeological, historical or 
ethnological studies. But the assumption of cost-bene"t 
considerations as a determinant of violent behavior "nds 
considerable support in contemporary individual-level 
studies. For adolescents and young adults a series of studies 
suggests that instrumental decision-making is involved 
in the likelihood of violent action (Nagin and Paternoster 
1993). In a recent large-scale study of o!ender decision-
making, based on the Denver Youth Survey, Matsueda, 
Kreager, and Huizinga (2006) found that rational choice 
processes have a signi"cant impact on violent acts amongst 
juveniles. Speci"cally, violence was positively associated 
with risk preference, the perceived coolness of violence (i.e. 
a gain in status), and the perceived opportunities, while it 
was negatively associated with the perceived risk of arrest.
$e strategic character of instrumental violence is also evi-
denced by a body of research that shows how instrumental 
beliefs—i.e. beliefs about how e!ective aggression is in mak-
ing others comply—predict actual violent behavior (Fagan 
and Wilkinson 1998). More particularly, instrumental 
beliefs predict aggressive behavior amongst children (Tap-
per and Boulton 2004), school bullying (John Archer 2004), 
physical aggression against partners (John Archer and 
Graham-Kevan 2003), and corporal punishment (Holden, 
Miller, and Harris 1999). A recent study in Ghana has 
replicated these "ndings in a non-Western context (Owusu-
Banahene and Amadahe 2008).
4. Theoretical Perspectives
Conceiving of violence as an instrument means that theory 
construction must be focused on providing an answer to 
the questions: What problems does violence solve? Under 
what circumstances do actors resort to violence as a sub-
jectively promising strategy? And how do social structures 
create and limit the situations in which violence is seen as a 
promising strategy to achieve a goal?
4.1. Judgment and Decision-making in Violent Acts
For decades, psychologists made a distinction between 
situational and person-oriented explanations of violence 
(Pervin 1986). Situational explanations o-en refer to the 
famous Milgram experiments and argue that under speci"c 
situational contexts any person can be made to behave 
aggressively (Zimbardo 2004). Person-oriented explana-
tions emphasize the stability of aggressive behavior during 
the life course and the robust evidence for links between 
personality characteristics and behavior outcomes (Loeber 
and Hay 1997).
However, most current theorists agree that some people are 
more aggressive than others and that some situations are 
more likely to trigger aggression than others, in other words 
that both internal mechanisms and external triggers are 
operating in social behavior (Pervin 1986). Or, as Buss and 
Shackelford put it: “No mechanism, no behavior; no input, 
no behavior” (1997, 607).
$e premise that violence is goal-directed intentional action 
requires an action theory of the judgment and decision-
making process involved in assaulting, robbing, or killing 
other people. In fact, an adequate model of the real-time 
interaction between the hormonal, neurocognitive, and 
evaluative processes within a human on the one side and 
the situational context on the other is the eye of the needle 
for any violence theory (Wikström 2003).
Several such theories have been suggested recently (e.g. C. 
A. Anderson and Bushman 2002; Crick and Dodge 1996; 
Fontaine 2007; Wikström and Treiber 2009). Most of these 
assume bounded rationality in the sense that humans 
have preferences and make decisions about how to achieve 
their goals, but that their judgments depend on—amongst 
others—their cognitive abilities and personality, their 
interpretation of the situation, their pre-existing behavioral 
routines, the speed at which they need to decide, and their 
emotional state. $ey thus combine assumptions about 
goal-directed behavior with psychological models of cogni-
tion and information processing (Nagin 2007). O-en, such 
models incorporate more general action and decision-mak-
ing models such as, for example, the Fishbein/Ajzen model 
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of planned action (Ajzen 1988) or variants of rational choice 
models such as the subjective expected utility model (SEU).
Probably the most complex integrative model currently 
available is the one developed by Anderson and Bush-
man (2002). $eir General Aggression Model incorporates 
several domain-speci"c theories and explicitly conceives of 
humans as processors of information who use knowledge 
structures (“scripts”) that guide them through situations. 
Essentially the model starts with the con#uence in time 
and space of a person with a situation. $is “input” includes 
all the biological, environmental, psychological, and social 
characteristics of the person and the context. On the side 
of the person, the combination of these inputs determines 
a latent preparedness to aggress. $e interaction between 
situation and person is then assumed to trigger change in 
the internal state of the person. $is entails the application 
of cognitive scripts, emotional reactions, arousal, and the 
activation or neutralization of moral inhibitions. Depend-
ing on an appraisal and decision process a violent or a non-
violent strategy is then chosen.
4.2. Evolutionary Perspective
Research from all angles has produced convincing evidence 
that some features of violence are remarkably similar across 
time and space. $ese commonalities comprise: the sex 
distribution of people involved in "ghting (mostly men); the 
approximate age at which people are most likely to engage 
in violence (about 18 to 35); essential goals over which "ghts 
are fought (material resources, power, and sex); situations 
that are prone to violence (e.g. humiliations in the pres-
ence of others); individual characteristics associated with 
violence (e.g. courage and risk-seeking); and emotional 
processes involved in violent encounters (e.g. arousal and 
anger).
Such commonalities are di.cult to understand from a 
purely cultural perspective. Rather, it is becoming increas-
ingly clear that any general theory of violence will need to 
integrate an evolutionary perspective on human nature 
(Pinker 2002). In an insightful paper, Wood (2007) has re-
cently laid out how and why an evolutionary perspective is 
an essential element for the way social scientists understand 
violence both historically and across societies.
On the most general level, an evolutionary perspective 
serves as a corrective to the view, long cherished amongst 
social scientists, that the human mind is essentially a 
blank slate, ready to store and retrieve whatever happens 
to characterize a given culture (Pinker 2002). In contrast, 
evolutionary psychologists emphasize that the “hard-
wired” architecture of our brain evolved over long periods 
of time as a solution to the adaptive problems posed by 
the environmental conditions and problems in the ances-
tral world (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). Hence the human 
brain is theorized to be a network of “regulatory circuits” 
that “organize the way we interpret our experiences, inject 
certain recurrent concepts and motivations into our mental 
life, and provide universal frames of meaning that allow us 
to understand the actions and intentions of others” (Tooby 
and Cosmides 1997).
In an in#uential paper, Buss and Shackelford (1997) pro-
posed an evolutionary framework for understanding 
human aggression. $ey suggest that such a perspective 
should develop empirically testable answers to a cluster of 
related questions, such as: What speci"c adaptive prob-
lems might be solved by aggression? What are the speci"c 
features of emotional and cognitive processes associated 
with violence, and can they be predicted and explained 
by hypotheses about the adaptive functions of aggression? 
What contexts trigger aggression, and can they be predicted 
and explained by speci"c hypotheses about the adaptive 
functions of aggression?
In developing answers to these questions Buss and Shackel-
ford (1997) suggest that aggression is a highly context-spe-
ci"c collection of strategies that have evolved as an adapta-
tion to recurrent problems that humans were confronted 
with during the history of human evolution. $ey may be 
grouped into strategies of proactive aggression developed 
to in#ict costs on rivals and reactive strategies that have 
developed to deter rivals and to defend one’s interests. $e 
proactive use of aggression entails violence as means to gain 
access to resources that are valuable for reproduction (land, 
water, food); as a strategy to win in competitions against 
intrasexual rivals; and a way to negotiate status and power 
hierarchies. Reactive uses include strategies where violence 
is used to defend against attack, situations where it serves 
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as a way to gain a reputation as aggressive in order to deter 
rivals from future aggression, and reactions that deter long-
term mates from sexual in"delity (jealousy).
Over the past twenty years, scholars have examined various 
types of violence from an evolutionary perspective. $ese 
include, for example, the studies by Wilson and Daly (1985) 
on patterns of homicide, research by Archer (1994) on the 
causes of male-to-male violence, work by Nell (2006) on the 
evolutionary bases of cruelty, and analyses by Wrangham 
(1999) on the evolution of coalitionary killing.
4.3. Social Institutions
$e third theoretical resource that I will assume to be nec-
essary for a general theory of violence is a consideration of 
social institutions. By social institutions I mean the rela-
tively permanent arrangements of behaviors, roles, norms, 
and values that structure aspects of human activity in 
patterned ways (Berger and Luckmann 1966). $is is hence 
similar to what historians or cultural anthropologists call 
culture. Institutions provide individuals with scripts that 
limit the contingency of situations and reduce the burden of 
decision-making. Also, institutions regulate access to and 
distribution of goods such as wealth or education. Examples 
of social institutions are the state, the family, the police, or 
schools.
Social institutions are a necessary element of a general 
theory of violence for several reasons (also see Messner and 
Rosenfeld 1994). First, social institutions make use of the 
instrumental character of violence by storing, organizing, 
distributing, and technologically enhancing violence in 
order to achieve speci"c goals. $e most important such 
institution that has emerged during the history of human-
ity is the state with the army and the police as its prominent 
violence specialists (e.g. Giddens 1985; Tilly 1985).
Second, social institutions produce normative behavior 
expectations, mechanisms for solving problems, and scripts 
for behavioral routines. As such they modify the parame-
ters that are relevant for individual judgment and decision-
making processes. For example, societies di!er in the extent 
to which “wife-beating” is considered to be a legitimate 
reaction to perceived “misbehaviors” within the institution 
of marriage (Haj-Yahia 1998; Haj-Yahia and de Zoysa 2007; 
Sakall 2001), which in turn can be expected to in#uence 
actual behaviors.
Finally, institutions can selectively cultivate or contain the 
personality characteristics and abilities associated with 
violence. For example, there are signi"cant di!erences over 
time and between societies in the extent to which ideals 
such as self-control, diligence, frugality, and sobriety are 
reinforced in the family or in schools (e.g. Eisner 2008) Such 
controls over spontaneous impulses may a!ect situational 
decision-making processes when a con#ict arises.
5. Three Cross-cutting Themes
$e perspective outlined above does not represent a theory. 
It is an analytical framework organized around the idea of 
violence as goal-directed instrumental action. Its usefulness 
as a basis for a general theory of violence depends on the 
extent to which it can help to elucidate general mechanisms 
that operate similarly across a variety of manifestations of 
violence. In the following section I will use this framework 
to explore three themes that are likely to be implicated in 
the goal-directed use of violence. 
5.1. Revenge and Protection
5.1.1. Revenge
As retaliation for an actual or perceived initial wrongdoing 
or provocation, revenge is a powerful motivator of violence. 
Keeley (1996, 199), for example, has reviewed anthropologi-
cal "ndings on the causes of the recurrent wars in non-state 
societies. $e data he presents suggest that revenge was a 
motive in more than 70 percent of all pre-modern wars, 
probably making it the most universal motive for war in hu-
man history. Similarly, vengeance and feuding represent a 
major motivational force in many societies with high levels 
of intra-group killing such as medieval Scotland (Wormald 
1980), Corsica (S. Wilson 1988), and the Balkans (Boehm 
1984) in the nineteenth century, and the North-West Fron-
tier Province of Pakistan (Knudsen 2008), or the South of 
the United States (Cohen and Nisbett 1994).
Furthermore, revenge has also been the motive for pain-
ful corporal punishment by the state. $us, many early 
criminal laws are essentially price-lists for taking revenge 
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in a more rationalized and disciplined way (e.g. Barrett and 
Harrison 1999, 1). Also, a major purpose of the public hang-
ing, burning, and dismembering practiced widely across 
Early Modern Europe consisted in establishing the state as 
the emerging monopolist of revenge. Finally, much aggres-
sive behavior amongst children and adolescents belongs to 
a group of acts that have been classi"ed as reactive ag-
gression, i.e. aggressive responses to a perceived threat or 
a provocation (Dodge 1991; Kempes et al. 2005; Price and 
Dodge 1989).
Across the various disciplines di!erent terms have been 
used to describe this bundle of behaviors. Frequently used 
terms are reactive aggression (Dodge 1991), retaliatory 
violence (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003), revenge (Chagnon 
1988), moralistic violence (Cooney 1997), self-help (Black 
1983), or punishment. $eir instrumental core is that they 
are committed to righting a wrong, whether this is a previ-
ous attack, an insult, an unpaid debt, disobedience, an act 
of sexual in"delity, or an assault. $e associated universal 
emotional mechanism is anger (Kempes et al. 2005); as 
$omas Aquinas recognized eight hundred years ago, “an-
ger is a craving for vengeance” (Aquinas 1920).
5.1.2. A General Mechanism?
Evolutionary psychologists and economists have long been 
interested in the underlying logic of the anger-retaliation 
mechanism amongst humans (e.g. Buss and Shackelford 
1997; Fehr and Gächter 2002; McCullough 2008; Trivers 
1971). Essentially they argue that violence-as-retaliation is 
an adaptive behavioural pattern. It evolves in any world 
where unconditional con"dence in the positive intentions 
of others is not a successful strategy and where cooperation 
in a group needs to be protected. Primarily, it solves three 
interrelated problems (McCullough, 2008):
First, revenge deters aggressors from aggressing again. 
Unless e!ective measures are taken, the costs of attack ap-
proach zero for the aggressor. For the target, in contrast, the 
likelihood of oneself incurring costs in terms of losing vital 
resources, forfeiting freedom, or su!ering injury or death 
become extremely high. Revenge increases the transaction 
costs of taking advantage of a person or his/her resources. 
In other words: aggressors have to consider the risk of being 
hurt, killed, or losing status when attacking another person 
or group.
Second, revenge warns would-be harm-doers to back o!. 
Revenge thus has a warning e!ect on third-party observers. 
If you let somebody harm you without retaliating, others 
might be tempted to do the same. If, however, you maintain 
a reputation for "ghting back, others will show deference 
and interact more carefully with you. Experimental studies 
by social psychologists suggest that this is actually the case: 
Victims retaliate more strongly when an audience witnesses 
the provocation (Kim, Smith, and Brigham 1998). Similarly, 
cross-cultural and historical research suggests that societies 
with high homicide rates are characterized by the predomi-
nance of "ghts between men in public space, where observ-
ers can easily assess the retaliatory ability of the combatants 
(Eisner 2008).
$e third and probably most important mechanism was 
initially formulated in a ground-breaking paper by Trivers 
(1971). In his seminal paper, Trivers examined formally how 
the existence of reciprocal altruistic behavior, i.e. helping 
each other, sharing food, contributing to defense e!orts, 
can be explained. $e core of this problem is how humans 
can be brought to contribute to a collective task rather 
than taking advantage and leaving the work to others—a 
problem formally represented in game theory as the free-
rider problem (Fehr and Gächter 2002). Trivers argued that 
the evolved adaptive mechanism to solve this problem is 
moralistic aggression, a bundle of emotional and behavioral 
reactions that humans show when norms of reciprocity are 
violated, i.e. the initial behavior is perceived as an attempt 
to gain unjust or unfair advantage. $e emotional process 
connected to moralistic aggression is anger, the feeling that 
mobilizes retaliation in face of a provocation.
5.1.3. Retaliation and Social Order
One important function of retaliatory violence is hence 
the maintenance of social order (also see Black 1983). For 
example, many traditional societies condone killing as 
a reaction to insult, adultery, or sorcery, or in retaliation 
to prior attack. In such societies there is little di!erence 
between retaliatory murder and capital punishment. In a 
fascinating study, Knau- (1987) examined violence amongst 
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the Gebusi, a simple egalitarian society in the highlands of 
New Guinea. A-er collecting data on the causes of death 
over "ve generations he found that 33 percent of 394 deaths 
were homicides, equivalent to an annual homicide rate of 
about 570 per 100,000. Examining the situational contexts 
he found that most homicides occurred as reactions to sor-
cery: $e process is triggered by the death through sickness 
of a community member, which is believed to result from 
sorcery. During a divinatory death inquest a medium then 
names a sorcery suspect, followed by further public divina-
tions to con"rm the evidence. If the outcome is unfavor-
able, the suspect is o-en killed on the spot. $is killing of 
sorcery suspects by adults is regarded as a communal duty 
and rarely results in any further retributions. In fact, Knau- 
(1987, 475) emphasizes that child-rearing patterns are highly 
a!ectionate and that anger and aggressiveness are strikingly 
absent from day-to-day life (Knau- 1987).
O-en revenge is associated with a culture of honor, which 
emphasizes pride in manhood, masculine courage, asser-
tiveness, physical strength, and warrior virtues (Figueredo 
et al. 2004). Examples include the Albanian code of honor 
and blood feuding known as the Kanun (Arsovska 2006), 
the tradition of blood-revenge and honorable cattle-the- in 
nineteenth-century Sardinia and Corsica (S. Wilson 1988); 
or the culture of masculine assertiveness among the Suri in 
Southern Ethiopia (Abbink 1998). In such societies the abil-
ity to retaliate e!ectively is valued highly. $ose who lose 
in "ghts are likely to lose face, honor, and reputation. $ose 
who win are respected, gain in social status, and are o-en 
admired by women.
In their culture of honor theory, Cohen and Nisbett (1996) 
develop an argument about the structural underpinnings 
of honor cultures. It assumes that private retribution and 
honor cultures emerge in the absence of e!ective state 
control. $is is particularly the case in herding economies, 
where “Herdsmen must be willing to use force to protect 
themselves and their property when law enforcement is 
inadequate and when one’s wealth can be rustled away” 
(Cohen et al. 1996). In such conditions, a man must seek to 
do right, but when wrong is done to him, he must punish 
the wrongdoer to restore order and justice in the world.
Remarkably, similar cultural codes emerge in modern 
societies under conditions where the state provides in-
su.cient or no protection from threat, or where illegal 
markets require private protection. $us, several research-
ers have examined the conditions under which “codes of 
violence”—essentially justi"cations of violence as a means 
of con#ict resolution and acquisition of status—emerge in 
US neighborhoods (E. Anderson 1999; Matsueda, Draku-
lich, and Kubrin 2006). Results suggest that a code of the 
street emerges in impoverished neighborhoods where the 
state fails to provide protection from threat. $is code is as-
sociated with safeguarding respect; “watching one’s back;” 
deterring transgression by clothing, demeanor, and way of 
moving; retaliating if respect is lacking; and taking care of 
oneself in the face of danger (E. Anderson 1994).
5.1.4. Protection
Even if regulated by cultural conventions, revenge systems 
based on kin obligations, such as the blood-feud, tend 
towards an equilibrium with very high mortality rates. $ey 
generate self-reinforcing circles of retaliation and counter-
retaliation that sometimes only come to a halt through 
elimination, domination, or exhaustion of resources (Boe-
hm 1984). $eir capacity to produce protection therefore 
hinges on the ability to limit circles of retaliation, a goal that 
revenge societies found chronically di.cult to achieve.
In more complex societies retaliation by members of kin is 
superseded by larger organizations that specialize in using 
violence to produce coercion and protection. Such protec-
tion entrepreneurs are likely to emerge when there are good 
chances to make a pro"t from controlling a territory, when 
there is demand for skilled retaliators, and when there is no 
e!ective protection at a higher level of social organization. 
Manifestations of violent protection entrepreneurs include 
vigilante groups, organized crime, pirates, warlords, emerg-
ing states, and possibly—to some extent—youth gangs.
As Hobbes (1968 [1660]) recognized long ago, such institu-
tions represent solutions to the freerider-anger-revenge 
problem in that they try to reduce private self-help by mo-
nopolizing the use of force.
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Frederic Lane analyzed the problem over "-y years ago in a 
seminal article on the “economic consequences of orga-
nized violence” (1958, 1979). Lane argued that very early in 
the history of the division of labor large enterprises emerge 
that specialize in using violence against outsiders and in 
controlling violence within their area of in#uence. Typical-
ly, such enterprises strove to establish territorial monopolies 
and demanded payment for the protection they provided. 
Some of these entrepreneurs eventually turned into states 
that e!ectively monopolized violence and commanded 
regular taxes, but for many centuries they coexisted with 
feudal lords, private warlords, pirates, bandits, or other or-
ganizers of violence who used racketeering to produce both 
violence and protection.
In Europe, the past thousand years can be characterized 
as a long-term trend towards the disappearance of most 
protection entrepreneurs (e.g. feudal landlords, private 
warlords, pirates) and the monopolization of its production 
in nation-states (see also, e.g. Elias 1976; Giddens 1985; Tilly 
1985). In e!ect, Lane argues that states had an incentive 
to produce e!ective protection at low costs as it attracted 
enterprises and generated protection rent, which could be 
used to maintain courtiers, to expand bureaucracies, or to 
control colonial territories. To the extent that these mo-
nopolists increasingly produced legitimate mechanisms of 
con#ict resolution that people used when norms of reci-
procity were broken, private self-help and revenge became 
gradually more marginalized—a process that may account 
for the signi"cant decline in interpersonal violence since 
the Middle Ages (Eisner 2003).
In contemporary societies, a recurrent phenomenon on 
the border between legitimate and illegitimate violence is 
vigilantism, i.e. groups of people who defend a given legal 
and sociopolitical order without a legal entitlement to do so 
(D. M. Anderson 2002; Johnston 1996; Rosenbaum and Se-
derberg 1974). Vigilante action is both policing and crime. It 
usually comprises some kind of taxation, the protection and 
surveillance of territories, and instant private justice—but 
may also entail drug tra.cking, death squads, and public 
lynchings. Vigilante groups typically emerge when the state 
monopoly of force crumbles in weak states, when the state 
and the police are perceived as corrupt, ine.cient, and 
illegitimate, or when civil strife or revolutions undermine 
e!ective state control (Tankebe 2009).
Recently, Sobel and Osoba (forthcoming) have developed a 
similar argument regarding youth gangs. $ey argue that 
youth gangs evolve under conditions where the govern-
ment fails to protect younger individuals from violence. 
Under such circumstances youth gangs are comparable to 
protection "rms that use coercion and violence to enforce 
their rules. $e authors test the assumption on the basis of 
monthly data on gang membership and homicide in Los 
Angeles. $eir results suggest that an increase in homicide 
predicts gang membership but that the inverse is not true. 
In a similar vein, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997) speak of 
gangs as primitive states.
Overall, these arguments suggest that revenge, retribu-
tion, justice, and the state are part of a continuum and 
generated by one underlying mechanism. $e analysis of 
such phenomena illuminates the Janus-faced character of 
violence both as a means for causing harm and a technique 
for providing protection from attack.
5.2. Intrinsic Rewards
Despite his pessimistic view of human nature, Hobbes (1968 
[1660]) did not think that humans would "nd causing harm 
to others a desirable goal in itself: “For, that any man should 
take pleasure in other men’s great harms, without other end 
of his own, I do not conceive it possible.” He may have been 
wrong in this respect. Certainly most people in most situa-
tions do not experience pleasurable emotions when watch-
ing or in#icting death (Bandura 2006). However, there is 
considerable evidence that amongst some social groups and 
in some contexts a signi"cant proportion of participants 
report agreeable emotions, and that this can’t be reduced to 
individual pathologies (Baumeister and Campbell 1999; Nell 
2006).
Some of this evidence relates to watching the in#iction of 
pain and su!ering. Historical research, for example, sug-
gests that in many societies public torture, human sacri"ce, 
staged deadly "ghts, executions, or the public burning of 
heretics attracted large crowds of spectators who were ex-
cited watching cruel spectacles (Auguet 1972; Dülmen 1990; 
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Kyle 1998; Spierenburg 1984). In modern societies, watch-
ing violent media contents or playing aggressive computer 
games is associated with physiological reactions such as 
arousal and excitation that signi"cant proportions of young 
men experience as pleasurable (e.g. C. A. Anderson 2003; C. 
A. Anderson and Bushman 2001). 
Excitement and arousal are also reported as correlates of 
violence in ethnographic analyses. For example, Katz’s 
analyses of street robbery provide ample evidence that gang 
members experience the power, domination, and humili-
ation associated with a robbery as lustful, exciting, and 
interesting (Katz 1988). Examining street robberies in Eng-
land, Bennett and Brookman (2008) also found that buzz 
and excitement were prominent amongst the motives for 
street violence. Similarly, a recent study on school violence 
reported that about 70 percent of middle-school students 
found at least some kinds of violence to be fun and enjoy-
able (Kerbs and Jolley 2007).
Possibly, these "ndings have more to do with the arousal 
resulting from doing something risky rather than with vio-
lence as such. Disturbingly, however, there is also evidence 
that the actual violent act has an intrinsically rewarding 
component (Baumeister and Campbell 1999; Grossman 
1996). For example, Bourke (1999), who analyzed the experi-
ences of British, Australian, and American troops in World 
War I, World War II, and Vietnam, found that killing was 
not only stressful and disturbing. A signi"cant proportion 
of soldiers also reported intense feelings of pleasure once 
their resistance to killing had been overcome by training 
(also, e.g. Grossman 1996; Jones 2006). Similarly, Bar and 
Ben-Ari (2005) found that Israeli snipers reported joy and 
satisfaction as well as distress, guilt, and horror when kill-
ing their adversaries. $is con#uence of antagonistic feel-
ings seems widespread, while “pure” enjoyment of violence 
is rare. $us Grossman (1996) estimates that about 2 percent 
of soldiers may be regarded as “sociopaths” who do not feel 
any remorse at any stage before, during, or a-er the killing.
Finally, there is evidence that during massacres and geno-
cidal killings the initial inhibitions against doing harm can 
quickly be replaced by an emotional state of collective rage, 
in which people with no prior signs of psychosis engage in 
rape, torture, mutilation, dismemberment, or the killing 
of children. $ese conditions appear to be characterized 
by a con#uence of extreme emotional states, but triumph, 
arousal, and pleasure o-en play a signi"cant part (Dutton 
2007; Dutton, Boyanowsky, and Bond 2005).
Admittedly, "ndings on the intrinsic rewards of violence 
come from a range of very di!erent sources and little has 
yet been done to systematically review the evidence. Also, 
even at a super"cial glance the attraction of violence ap-
pears as a mix of di!erent mechanisms and emotional 
reactions. In particular, one should distinguish between the 
physiological and emotional processes associated with pas-
sively watching staged violence, the arousal in anticipation 
of violence, the emotions during the immediate involve-
ment in violent acts, and the long term coping processes 
a-er having committed a violent act. Nonetheless, the 
similarity of "ndings across cultures and the association 
of agreeable emotions with very di!erent types of violence 
require explanation.
As far as I can see no such explanation is currently avail-
able, although various authors have provided tentative 
suggestions. Nell (2006), for example, examined whether 
the apparent rewards of cruelty can be explained from an 
evolutionary perspective. He argues that the pleasurable 
emotions associated with cruelty (experienced by some 
people in some situations) have two distal causes. For one, 
the underlying arousal and pleasure is a by-product of 
predation. Secondly, cruelty is associated, within human 
societies, with social inequality and power whereby cruelty 
serves to express dominance, humiliation, and degradation.
Acknowledging that much is currently unknown about 
when any violence has an intrinsic appeal, Baumeister and 
Campbell (1999) tentatively suggest three circuits of intrin-
sic rewards that may be associated with violence. $e "rst is 
sadism, the achievement of pleasure from harming others. 
More speci"cally, referring to the opponent-process theory 
proposed by Solomon and Corbit (1974), Baumeister and 
Campbell argue that by repeating violent acts (or, I would 
add, by experiencing support from a group of other perpe-
trators) the initial aversive, distressed response is reduced 
and the more pleasant aspects become more dominant.
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Secondly, rather than being associated with the harm-doing 
itself, intrinsic rewards may be linked to doing something 
arousing, risky, and stimulating, thus providing an escape 
from boredom. Violence may thus satisfy a need for risk- 
and sensation-seeking, a personality characteristic that 
varies between the sexes (men higher than women) and 
over the life course (declining from age 20) in a way that is 
compatible with the distribution of many manifestations of 
violence (Zuckerman, Eysenck, and Eysenck 1978).
$e third form of intrinsic appeal involves a.rming the self 
by harming someone who has threatened one’s own positive 
self-image. $is is the reward mechanism that is associ-
ated with violent reactions to perceived insult, challenged 
masculinity, or injustice. It is thus linked to the themes of 
revenge, self-help, and power discussed above. However, 
rather than emphasizing the extrinsic motivations inherent 
in such dynamics, Baumeister and Campbell highlight that 
violence in itself may help to stabilize and indeed in#ate no-
tions of dominance and superiority.
It may well be that the satisfaction resulting from success-
ful predation, the arousal in anticipation of risky tasks, and 
the pleasures of showing prowess and dominance over the 
enemy are evolved mechanisms of intrinsic grati"cation 
associated with violence. Also, there are well-documented 
di!erences, within each society, in the extent to which 
individuals enjoy watching violence or doing risky and 
exciting things that may end with somebody getting injured 
(Zuckerman, Eysenck, and Eysenck 1978).
However, historical and cross-cultural evidence also sug-
gests that cultural norms embedded in social institutions 
are powerful forces that sometimes amplify and sometimes 
successfully control and marginalize the pleasures of vio-
lence. Probably the best evidence for this e!ect is long-term 
change in the sensitization to violence that historians of 
violence have documented in great detail, and that Norbert 
Elias described as a civilizing process (J. Anderson 2001; 
Wood 2004; Elias 1978; Spierenburg 1984; Wiener 2004). It is 
visible in the gradual disappearance of the “spectacle of suf-
fering” enacted in public displays of judicial revenge from 
the late-seventeenth century onwards. But it is also evident, 
for example, in the relentless e!orts of nineteenth-century 
elites to control, and "nally bring to an end, public prize 
"ghts that attracted huge crowds and o-en ended with the 
death of one of the combatants.
5.2.1. Sweet Revenge
At "rst sight the notion of intrinsic rewards seems to con-
tradict the idea of violence as goal-directed instrumental 
behavior. However, recent research suggests interesting 
links between the two. Most particularly, de Quervain 
and colleagues (2004) explored the physiological processes 
involved in the kind of altruistic punishment (i.e. aggres-
sion in reaction to perceived wrongdoing) described in the 
previous section. In experimental studies they "nd that 
reward-related regions in the brain are activated when par-
ticipants punish defectors (i.e. players who do not cooper-
ate) and that the stronger the chosen level of punishment, 
the greater are these physiological rewards. $ey interpret 
these "ndings as evidence that revenge in the sense of retali-
ation against somebody who breaks rules of reciprocity is 
satisfying—that revenge is sweet.
5.3. Justi!cations
Violence di!ers from other types of human action in that 
it causes pain, su!ering, and death. However, in contrast to 
other animals, humans are generally able to comprehend 
the su!ering that they cause by harm-doing. $is ability 
is present from a very age. For example, sympathetic and 
empathic responding can be observed by the age of two to 
three years (Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow 1990). Also, 
children as young as "ve or six years clearly recognize facial 
expression of pain and this ability is fully developed by the 
age of about eleven or twelve (Deyo, Prkachin, and Mer-
cer 2004). $is nearly universal ability to feel compassion 
for the pain of others probably evolved as an evolutionary 
advantage as it is linked to lending assistance to in-group 
members who su!er or who are in peril (Trivers 1971).
$e ability of humans to feel empathy (cognition of others’ 
emotions) and sympathy (ability to feel others’ emotions), 
and to anticipate the harm caused by violent action poses 
a signi"cant hurdle to violence. Hence violence in all its 
forms and manifestations is in need of justi"cations, i.e. 
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narratives that lower the inhibitions against violence and 
rationalize violent conduct (Lamnek 2003).
In “Techniques of Neutralization: A $eory of Delin-
quency,” Sykes and Matza described and analyzed this 
mechanism more than "-y years ago (Maruna and Copes 
2005; Sykes and Matza 1957). $ey identi"ed techniques that 
are closely related to the concept of moral disengagement 
developed by Bandura (Bandura 1990, 1999; Bandura et al. 
1996). Bandura argues that humans have self-regulatory 
systems that guide them to behave in accordance with 
their moral standards. However, these control system are 
not perpetual overseers of conduct but only operate when 
activated. Mechanisms of disengagement permit actors to 
minimize the impact of self-sanction during the judgment 
and decision-making process that accompanies to harmful 
action. Bandura (1999) distinguishes three main points at 
which moral control can be disengaged.
A "rst set are cognitive reconstructions of the injurious be-
havior itself. Moral justi"cations are techniques of portray-
ing detrimental conduct as being in the service of valued 
social or moral purposes, for example to protect honor, the 
family, or liberty. Euphemistic language is a tool to couch 
destructive action in words that mask the su!ering caused 
by violent action, whether individual or collective. Robbers, 
rapists, generals (“collateral damage”), and mass murder-
ers (“"nal solution”) all use this strategy. Advantageous 
comparison refers to the strategy of comparing one’s own 
conduct with reprehensible conduct by others, thus provid-
ing moral justi"cation for destructive action. $is is the 
mechanism inherent in feuding or persistent gang wars, 
where highlighting the despicable nature of the acts of oth-
ers helps to legitimize the next round of violent action.
$e second set of disengagement practices aim at minimiz-
ing the subjective importance of individual agency entailed 
in aggressive acts. Displacement occurs when actors view 
their action as springing from social pressures, external 
circumstances, or dictated by others rather than their own 
deliberate decision. Di!usion occurs when personal agency 
is obscured by distributing action over a series of seemingly 
innocuous action steps or by spreading responsibility across 
a whole group.
Finally, Bandura and colleagues (1996) describe a set of dis-
engagement practices that operate on the victims of violent 
action. Moral self-censure is more likely when the harmed 
other is perceived as a human being with feelings and hopes 
that one can identify with. $is moral control mechanism 
can be disengaged by techniques of dehumanization. 
Dehumanization entails divesting others of their human 
qualities. It is applied to the targets of violent acts. Once 
dehumanized, divested of human qualities, people are no 
longer viewed as persons with feelings, hopes, and concerns 
but as subhuman objects. $ey no longer evoke feelings of 
empathy from the perpetrator and can be subjected to hor-
rendous treatment (Bandura et al. 1996, 366).
$e important achievement of Bandura’s social-cognitive 
theory is that it hypothesizes a set of universal justi"cation 
mechanisms that interfere with all aspects of intentional 
harm-doing. It identi"es cognitive and moral mechanisms 
that respond to a universal problem of violent acts, namely 
the in#iction of su!ering on others. For a perpetrator, 
who acts on the basis of goal-driven considerations, moral 
disengagement minimizes the subjective costs of harm do-
ing and maximizes the subjective “bene"ts.” In part, such 
justi"cations are probably mechanisms that operate a-er 
a "rst violent act has occurred. As such they are within-
individual processes that reduce self-sanctions and facilitate 
the repetition of similar acts. However, the cognitive scripts 
that facilitate moral disengagement are also transmitted 
through the family, schools, army o.cials, or ideologists. 
As such they are social mechanisms, transmitted through 
the institutions of a society.
Empirically, moral disengagement has been found to be a 
highly relevant predictor of various manifestations of ag-
gressive behavior (Bandura et al. 1996). Speci"cally, moral 
disengagement predicts physical and verbal aggression 
amongst children at the elementary and junior high school 
levels (Bandura et al. 1996; Pelton et al. 2004). Also, moral 
disengagement has been found to characterize moral-cog-
nitive processes amongst perpetrators of hate crime (Byers, 
Crider, and Biggers 1999), personnel involved in executions 
(Osofsky, Bandura, and Zimbardo 2005), and torturers 
(Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002).
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Furthermore, the combination of dehumanization and 
attribution of blame has been a highly successful strategy, 
throughout human history, for facilitating the most disas-
trous types of collective and state-led violent action (Day 
and Vandiver 2000; Haslam, 2006; Neubacher, 2006). In 
fact, Bandura (1996) argues that the concept of moral dis-
engagement has a particular potential to explain deliberate 
acts of destructiveness committed by ordinary, otherwise 
considerate people.
Remarkably, the criteria by which certain groups or bearers 
of certain criteria can become dehumanized are extremely 
variable across human history. $ey are the outgrowth of 
religious principles, righteous ideologies, or nationalis-
tic imperatives. Techniques of dehumanization served to 
justify the beheading of supposed enemies of the revolu-
tion during the terreur in the French Revolution (Tackett 
2000), the massacre of people who wore glasses (as a sign of 
belonging to the educated bourgeoisie) during the Khmer 
Rouge mass killings in Cambodia (Dutton, Boyanowsky, 
and Bond 2005), or Stalin’s planned mass starvation of 
Kulaks in the Ukraine.
5.3.1. Free-Riders and Cheaters
Bandura’s theory of moral disengagement is a social cogni-
tive theory, i.e. it identi"es mental operations that can 
be learned and that, when internalized, support violent 
conduct. It hypothesizes that essential patterns of justify-
ing violence are similar across cultures, over time, and for 
di!erent types of violent acts. If true, it would provide a 
cross-cutting basis for understanding important universal 
social-cognitive mechanisms associated with violence.
However, it does not tell us why these mechanisms should 
be similar across cultures and situations. I cannot fully 
examine this question here. But it may be that part of the 
answer is related to the moralistic aggression mechanism 
mentioned earlier: As noted previously, humans appear to 
have a universal tendency to react with moralistic anger 
when rules of reciprocal cooperation are violated, i.e. when 
others try to be free-riders. $is is one reason why people 
"nd retaliatory violence more legitimate than unprovoked 
attacks. Remarkably, some of the moral disengagement 
mechanisms identi"ed by Bandura use precisely this 
freerider-anger-punishment mechanism. $ey manipulate 
the interpretation of the situation in such a way that harm-
doing looks like a retaliation against persons or groups 
allegedly trying to be free-riders.
In e!ect, it seems that all political manipulators, when stir-
ring up collective hatred, abuse the mechanism of moralis-
tic aggression. $ey present the target group as failing to re-
ciprocate (e.g. as a "-h column, as parasites, as exploitative 
scum) and thus mobilize the emotional responses needed to 
trigger extreme violence.
6. Conclusions
A general theory of violence in the strong sense of a set of 
universal laws that replaces local theories and explains all 
manifestations of violence is unrealistic. However, it may 
be possible to develop a general theory in the sense of a 
meta-theoretical framework that comprises a set of general 
mechanisms that operate across various manifestations of 
violence. In order to identify such mechanisms, a general 
theory of violence needs to equally consider all manifesta-
tions of violence, in all societies, and at all times.
$is paper has argued that a general theory should not be 
based on the patterns of individual criminal violence, which 
can be observed in wealthy, well-ordered, state-controlled 
societies. Understanding these manifestations of violence is 
important. However, for a general theory it has the adverse 
e!ect that a systematic structural, temporal, and geographi-
cal bias is built into the very foundations of the theory. In 
contrast, this paper has argued that the role and functions 
of violence need to be considered equally throughout the 
whole of human history and across the complete range of 
human cultures.
Similarly, this paper has made a case for a theory that does 
not start with the distinction between prohibited criminal 
violence and legitimate state use of force, which is then lim-
ited to explaining crimes. Besides the fact that the notion of 
crime does not apply to non-state societies—i.e. most hu-
man experience for most of human history—I have argued 
that the dual role of violence as a means of maintaining or-
der and as a strategy that transgresses accepted rules needs 
to be a cornerstone of a general theory of violence.
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Based on these considerations I have suggested elements of 
a meta-theoretical framework that assumes that violence is 
best understood as an instrument to achieve goals. $ree 
theoretical approaches may be combined in a non-contra-
dictory way to understand violence as goal-directed instru-
mental behavior: a theory of the judgment and decision-
making processes operating in the situations that give rise 
to violence; a theory of the evolutionary processes that have 
resulted in universal cognitive and emotional mechanisms 
associated with violence; and a theory of the way in which 
social institutions structure violence by selectively enhanc-
ing its e!ectiveness for some purposes (i.e. legitimate use of 
force) and controlling other types of violence (i.e. crime).
I have "nally explored three cross-cutting themes in order 
to examine whether some general mechanisms, associ-
ated with an instrumental notion of violence, may help to 
understand di!erent manifestations in various societies. 
$e goal here was not to fully develop theoretical models 
and to examine all their empirical implications. Rather, the 
aim was to demonstrate that empirical and theoretical re-
search can pro"t from transgressing the narrow borders of 
speci"c kinds of violence and highly speci"c mechanisms. 
For example, I have argued that the theory of moralistic 
aggression as an evolved mechanism to solve the free-rider 
problem and to encourage reciprocal cooperation provides 
an elegant model for understanding a large variety of mani-
festations of violence and to understand some foundations 
of social order.
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